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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EDWIN PAPSE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 
11,111 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Edwin Papse, appeals from an 
order of the District Court of Box Elder County de-
nying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
By order dated December 1, 1967, accompanied 
by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Honorable Lewis Jones denied appellant's petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the order of the First 
District Court denying appellant's petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus should be affirmed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 22, 1966, appellant and one George 
Jackson were arrested and charged with the crime 
of rape. On August 9 the court appointed counsel 
for appellant and thereafter defendants were ar-
raigned. At the arra'iqnment, all precautions were 
taken to guarantee the constitutional rights of ap-
pellant and defense counsel informed him of the 
consequences of a guilty plea. Appellant then en-
tered a plea of guilty. The appellant was sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison. 
In May of 1967, appellant petitioned for a writ 
of habeas corpus. A hearing was held on the matter 
on October 30, 1967, and on December 1, 1967, the , 
petition was denied. Appellant filed a second peti-
tion which was denied and appellant appeals from 
the denial of both petitions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN 
OF SHOWING THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT 
VOLUNTARY WHEN THE RECORD SHOWS COUN· 
SEL INFORMED HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES AND 
HIS PREVIOUS FELONY CONVICTION GA VE HIM 
NOTICE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A PLEA. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is 
upon the person petitioning for the writ to establish 
error prejudicing his rights before the writ will be 
granted. In State v. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d 14, 361 P.Zd 
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14, 361 P.2d 509 (1961), the court said, "The burden 
is upon the defendant to show that he has been 
denied his constitutional rights." If the burden of 
affirmatively showing error is not met, the trial 
court's findings and decision will be upheld. In 
Baine v. Beckstead. 10 Utah 2d 4, ll, 347 P.2d 554 
(1959), this court stated that, "In attacking it, (the rec-
ord), the burden was upon the defendants to affirm-
atively show error, failing which, the action of the 
trial court is deemed to be correct." This point was 
reiterated recently in Brown v. Turner, ............ Utah 
2d ............ , 440 P.2d 986, 969 (1968), a habeas corpus 
appeal in which the court said, "If the established 
rules of procedure are followed they assure ample 
protection of the rights of one who is accused of 
crime. After this has been done and a judgment has 
been rendered all presumptions favor its validity 
and the burden of showing to the contrary is upon 
one who attempts to upset it." The Supreme Court 
of Washington in Ex parte Tugas. 41 Wash. 2d 33, 
246 P.2d 851 (1952) held: "In habeas corpus proceed-
ings . . . the findings of the trial court will not be 
disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them." 
In this case, the respondent contends that ap-
pellant has failed to sustain his burden of showing 
that his plea of guilty was involuntarily entered. 
The trial court went the extra mile to insure and 
safeguard appellant's constitutional rights. The rec-
ord shows the court appointed counsel over appel-
lcmt' s objection (Tr. 80). 
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The record further shows that defendant knew 
the consequences of his plea; it was mentioned at 
trial, at the arraignment, and before the court ac-
cepted his plea. 
The testimony of appellant's counsel shows that 
he made every effort to inform appellant of the seri- i 
ousness of the charge and the consequences: " ... so 
I tried to explain to them the seriousness of the 
charge and the consequences and the possibility 
of things." (R. 49) Defendant didn't want a trial. "They 
didn't want the trial. in other words, and were quite 
adamant to the effect that they wanted to get it over 
with and not go through a trial." R. 53) Counsel in-
formed the defendant of the consequences of a 
guilty plea (R. 54); the defendant was further ad- ' 
vised of the consequences of the guilty plea (R. 56). 
It has been held that a presumption exists that 
the attorney has discharged his duties and " ... this 
presumption is not overcome by the uncorroborated 
statements of the petitioner in a habeas corpus pro· 
ceeding." Dexter v. Crouse, 192 Kan. 151, 386 P.Zd 
263, 266 (1963). Here, the record shows the attorney 
informed defendant of the consequences of a guilty 
plea and he knew what these consequences were. 
When one looks at the record and the fact that 
defendant was previously convicted of a felony in 
Idaho, and served part of a sentence because of a 
guilty plea, it is reasonable that appellant knew the 
consequences of his plea. It was stated at the ar· 
raignment that the sentence was a term in the State 
Prison; defense counsel's testimony shows that he 
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informed appellant of the consequences of a plea 
of guilty; appellant's previous conviction based on 
a guilty plea, point to one reasonable conclusion 
that appellant knew the consequences of his guilty 
plea and that the plea was voluntarily made. Appel-
lant could not prove any coercion and has not sus-
tained his burden of showing clearly that the plea 
was not voluntarily made. See Workman v. Turner. 
i 9 Utah 2d l, 425 P.2d 402 (1967). 
The rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in re-
1vewing habeas corpus proceedings, as stated by 
Mr. Justice Crockett in Brown v. Turner. supra. is 
applicable in this case. After stating that the burden 
is upon one attempting to upset a conviction to 
show his rights were impaired, the court said: 
... When such an attempt is made the administra-
tion of justice is best served by directing the in-
quiry to this foundational question: Was substantial 
justice done and has guilt been established? While 
on the one hand we honor the observance of the 
iights of the individua.l in order to protect the in-
nocent, on the other we cannot be oblivious to the 
necessity of protecting rights of the public to be 
kept safe from crime hy encouraging effective law 
enforcement. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL ,JUDGE HAS NO DUTY TO INQUIRE 
INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A GUILTY PLEA 
WHEN DEFENDANT IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL 
ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS REASONABLE TO BELIEVE 
'T'HE PLEA IS VOLUNTARILY MADE. 
Utah Law requires an explanation of the con-
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sequences of a plea of guilty when defendant is not 
represented by counsel. Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-6 
(1953). It is up to the descretion of the trial judge to 
refuse to accept a plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-7 
(1953). The trial judge, in his discretion, accepted 
the plea and where counsel is present, he has no 
duty to inform the defendant of the consequences 
of such a plea. It is reasonable for a trial judge to 
be able to rely on defense counsel adequately pro-
tecting the interests of his client and relating to them 
the consequences of their desired action. It is hard 
to imagine any difference in the outcome if the 
judge had specifically stated the possible sentence 
to appellant. Everything was done by counsel to , 
inform them of the consequences of the plea, the · 
seriousness of the charge and advisability of a trial. 
The record shows the judge mentioned the effect of 
guilty plea would be a prison term. (Tr. 81, 82) If 
after all that was done to clarify to defendant the 
consequences of what he was doing, and defend-
ant was confused, although it is hard to imagine 
how he was still confosed; r see argument, point I J, 
then nothing could have been done to erase this 
purported confusion. The argument of appellant's 
confusion is based on appellant's uncorroborated 
testimony and standing alone is not enough to over-
come the presumption of his attorney performing 
his duties. See Dexter v. Crouse, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's plea was voluntarily made and the 
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record shows that the consequences of his plea 
were explained to him. Every effort was made to 
insure his constitutional rights, counsel informed 
him on the consequences, and he had previously 
served time in the Idaho State Penitentiary based on 
a guilty plea. All these facts lead to a reasonable 
conclusion that defendant's plea was voluntary and 
informed when made. Appellant failed to sustain his 
burden of showing that the plea was involuntary 
and uninformed based on the record and the evi-
dence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
